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“A wealth tax doesn't raise enough to matter.”
Enough for what? A wealth tax isn't meant to fund a government, it's meant to stop the largest fortunes from outgrowing the economy
Net wealth taxes raised between 0.2% of GDP in Spain and 1.0% in Switzerland in 2016, and Norway's raised 0.59% in 2024. Uruguay's economists put a 1% tax on the top 1% at 0.75% to 1% of GDP, and a French bill put its minimum tax on fortunes above €100 million at €15 to 25 billion a year. The top 1% share of wealth rose between 1990 and 2024 in five of the six countries with a continuous record.
The objection measures a wealth tax against a government budget and finds it short. Nobody proposes to run a government on a tax on the richest 2%. A wealth tax has two jobs, and the objection counts one of them.
#Enough to pay for what
The taxes that exist raise between 0.2% of GDP in Spain and 1.0% in Switzerland, in the OECD's count for 2016. Switzerland collects the most because its thresholds are comparatively low and its base broader.[1] Norway's wealth tax came to 0.59% of GDP in 2024, a figure we worked out from Statistics Norway's tables, with oil counted in GDP.[2] Colombia collected COP 1.22 trillion from 34,229 filers in 2025, and Bolivia about Bs 960 million between 2021 and October 2025.[6][9]
New taxes on the table are the same size or larger. In Uruguay, two economists estimate that a 1% tax on the top 1% would raise 0.75% to 1% of GDP, US$600 to 800 million a year, after allowing for 17% lost to evasion.[3] A minimum tax of 2% on fortunes above US$100 million would raise about US$260 million, 0.4% of GDP.[4] A French bill from January 2025 puts its minimum tax of 2% on fortunes above €100 million at €15 to 25 billion a year.[5] In Germany the Greens' motion expects more than €20 billion a year from a few hundred payers, and the research institute DIW puts the Left's higher scale at €147 billion a year before anyone changes behaviour.[10] For the United States, two economists estimate that Warren's tax would raise about US$3.0 trillion over 2023 to 2032, about 1% of GDP a year, after assuming a 15% cut in what taxpayers pay through avoidance and evasion.[11]
The money has uses. Denmark's Social Democrats tied their 2026 proposal to smaller school classes, and Uruguay's union commission tied its proposal to a fund against child poverty.[13][14]
#Why some taxes raised little
Some existing taxes raised little, and the reason is the holes in them. Sweden's wealth tax came to 0.16% of GDP in 2006, its last full year, and never exceeded 0.4% of GDP in the postwar years.[8] It exempted unlisted shares and the biggest fortunes were held in them. Bolivia's yield fell from Bs 241 million in 2021 to Bs 169 million in 2024 under the same scale, a scale that has no indexing.[9] And the big projections vary with design: DIW's €147 billion for the Left's scale is before behavioural responses, and the Left's own motion says about €100 billion after them.[10] A tax with a broad base and low thresholds raises more. Switzerland shows it.
#The second job: the compounding
The second job is to keep the largest fortunes from outgrowing the economy. The top 1% share of net personal wealth rose between 1990 and 2024 from 24.1% to 31.5% in Switzerland, from 17.7% to 27.7% in France, from 24.0% to 27.5% in Sweden, from 21.9% to 27.9% in Germany and from 29.0% to 34.8% in the United States. In Norway it stayed at 23.5%.[7]
The arithmetic is simple. If a group's wealth grows at a rate g and the economy at a rate y, a tax of about g minus y a year on that wealth holds the group's share steady. The United States gives one measured case. The wealth of the top 0.1% of households grew from US$6.8 trillion in 2006 to US$27.9 trillion in 2026, a factor of 4.1, while nominal GDP grew by a factor of 2.4. That is 7.3% a year against 4.4%, a gap of about 3 points.[12] A tax of about 3% of that group's wealth a year would close the gap. Warren's top rate is 3%.
This is why counting revenue misses the point. A tax that raises 1% of GDP and keeps the top fortunes from outrunning the economy has done something no amount of spending can undo later.
#What it takes to turn it around
The same arithmetic runs further. A tax above the growth gap would shrink the group's share of wealth. Reversing the trend takes a rate above the gap, and an enforcement system that finds the assets. A 1% tax doesn't do it where the gap is 3 points. A tax of 3% to 4% on the largest fortunes would.
#Who says so
Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman wrote several of the revenue estimates. The Uruguayan story covers the two Uruguayan economists, the French story the 2025 bill, and the German story the motions.
#Where to look next
The next page takes up the claim that a wealth tax hurts growth. The first page covers the concentration data across countries.
#Sources
- [1] OECD, The Role and Design of Net Wealth Taxes in the OECD, OECD Tax Policy Studies (2018), chapter 1 ↗
- [2] Statistics Norway, StatBank tables 08815 (wealth tax) and 10799 (national accounts); ratio calculated from NOK 31,784 million and GDP of NOK 5,382,441 million, 2024 ↗
- [3] Mauricio De Rosa and Joan Vilá, Consideraciones sobre un gravamen al 1% más rico, letter to the PIT-CNT (2 July 2025) ↗
- [4] Vicente Silva, Uruguay, Impuesto Mínimo Efectivo sobre la Riqueza, International Tax Observatory and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (April 2026) ↗
- [5] Assemblée nationale, proposition de loi n° 768 instaurant un impôt plancher de 2 % sur le patrimoine des ultra riches (7 January 2025), exposé des motifs ↗
- [6] La República, Al cierre de 2025, 34.229 contribuyentes pagaron el impuesto al patrimonio (18 August 2026), DIAN figures ↗
- [7] World Inequality Database, net personal wealth, adults, equal split (variable shweal992j), bulk file read on 8 November 2026 ↗
- [8] Gunnar Du Rietz and Magnus Henrekson, Swedish Wealth Taxation, 1911 to 2007, IFN Working Paper 1000 (2015) ↗
- [9] Servicio de Impuestos Nacionales (Bolivia), Memoria Enero-Octubre 2025, section 1.4 and Cuadro 3 ↗
- [10] Bach, Wichers and Mudrack, Vermögensteuer Die Linke, Aufkommens- und Verteilungswirkungen, DIW Politikberatung kompakt 211 (23 January 2026) ↗
- [11] Saez and Zucman, Wealth Tax Revenue Estimates for the Ultra-Millionaire Tax Act of 2021 (24 February 2021) ↗
- [12] Federal Reserve, Distributional Financial Accounts (2026 Q2) and FRED, nominal GDP; growth rates calculated from the 2006 Q2 and 2026 Q2 values ↗
- [13] TV 2, Socialdemokratiet vil beskatte de 22.000 rigeste danskere (26 February 2026) ↗
- [14] PIT-CNT consultative commission, Propuesta de creación de una sobretasa del IPPF (24 November 2025) ↗