Wealth Tax Supporters
Feedback

Draft The wording, numbers and structure of this page are still being revised and will change.

“A wealth tax hurts growth and investment.”

The studies of wealth taxes find small effects on investment, and the evidence on what public money does points the other way

A study of Swedish and Danish data finds a one point higher top wealth tax rate lowers investment by 0.07% and output by 0.10%. In Norway households save more under wealth taxation, and firms pay out no more and invest no less. The IMF finds public investment of 1% of GDP lifts output 1.5% after four years, and that redistribution is generally benign for growth.

The objection says taxing wealth slows an economy. It hides two questions: what the tax does to investment, and what the money does once it's spent. Both have been studied.

#What the studies of wealth taxes find

The best study of the combined effect uses Swedish and Danish tax records. A one percentage point rise in the top wealth tax rate lowers the number of wealthy taxpayers by about 2%, total employment by 0.02%, investment by 0.07% and output by 0.10%. The authors call the effects modest, and they were published in the American Economic Review in 2026.[1] For a tax that raises 0.2% to 1% of GDP, that is a very small price.

In Norway, the households studied saved more under wealth taxation, mainly because they earned more from work.[3] After the 2021 to 2024 increases, firms owned by wealth tax payers paid out no more dividends, invested no less and didn't go bankrupt more often.[2] In Catalonia, higher wealth taxes did not reduce what people saved.[4]

#The owner who leaves

When an owner leaves Sweden or Denmark, the firm's employment falls 33%, investment 22% and output 34%, mostly through closure.[1] The same study estimates that migration raises what it costs the state to raise another krona from about 2.2 to 4.2.[1] The Danish evidence also finds that the tax slows how fast the very wealthy accumulate.[10] And the OECD wrote in 2018 that there are limited arguments for a net wealth tax where broad taxes on capital income and on inheritance already exist.[11]

Look at what these findings are about. They describe taxes with high rates, with exemptions and reliefs, in small open countries where owners can cross a border. Slowing the accumulation of the largest fortunes is the aim of the tax. The page on departures covers the owners who leave, and a design with a high threshold, an exit tax and no exemptions for business assets cuts that problem down.

#What the money does

The other half of the question is what the revenue buys.

The IMF finds that an unexpected rise in public investment of 1% of GDP lifts output by about 0.4% the same year and by 1.5% four years later, in advanced economies. The effect is larger where there is slack and where projects are well chosen.[5] IMF staff conclude that redistribution is generally benign for growth, and that lower inequality goes with faster and more lasting growth.[6]

The OECD finds that rising inequality drags down growth. A rise of 3 Gini points would cost 0.35 percentage points of growth a year for 25 years, a cumulative loss of 8.5% of GDP, and the effect comes from the bottom 40% of earners, not the top tenth.[7]

On individual programmes, the economists Hendren and Sprung-Keyser find that spending on children gives the highest return per dollar. Four expansions of child health insurance in the United States repaid on average US$1.78 to the government for each US$1 spent.[8] Wealth tax proposals aim at exactly this kind of spending: Uruguay's union commission wants a fund against child poverty, and Denmark's 2026 proposal was for smaller school classes.[12][13]

#Growth of what, and for what

GDP counts output and says nothing about what it's for. Simon Kuznets, the economist whose work built the national accounts, wrote in 1962: "Distinctions must be kept in mind between quantity and quality of growth, between its costs and return, and between the short and long term...Objectives should be explicit: goals for more growth should specify more growth of what and for what."[14]

A commission led by the economists Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi wrote in 2009 that GDP "has often been treated as if it were a measure of economic well-being", and that mixing the two up leads to the wrong policy decisions. Their report notes that most people can be worse off even though average income is rising, if inequality grows enough.[9]

So ask what growth. If a wealth tax slows the growth of fortunes that no one spends or invests usefully, and pays for schools, health care and children's futures, it has made the economy better, whatever it does to GDP.

#What follows

Judge a wealth tax by what the studies measure: its effect on investment and firms, which is small in the best evidence, and the use of the money, which has strong evidence behind it for children and infrastructure. Design it to avoid the problems: a high threshold, a broad base, an exit tax and no exemptions that push owners to reshuffle assets.

#Who says so

The Norwegian story covers the Norwegian studies, the Swedish story and the Danish story cover the repeal evidence, and the Uruguayan story covers the earmark.

#Where to look next

The next page takes up the claim that a wealth tax is unconstitutional. The page on departures covers what happens when an owner moves.

#Sources

  1. [1] Jakobsen, Kleven, Kolsrud, Landais and Muñoz, Taxing Top Wealth: Migration Responses and Their Aggregate Economic Implications, American Economic Review 116(10), 3674-3720 (2026), accepted version ↗
  2. [2] Marius Ring, Taxing Entrepreneurial Wealth, Evidence from Norway, 2021 to 2025, NBER Working Paper 35854 (October 2026, not peer reviewed) ↗
  3. [3] Marius Ring, Wealth Taxation and Household Saving, Evidence from Assessment Discontinuities in Norway, Review of Economic Studies 92(5), 2025 ↗
  4. [4] Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré and Mas-Montserrat, Behavioural responses to the (re)introduction of wealth taxes, Evidence from Spain, IEB Working Paper 2019/04 ↗
  5. [5] IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2014, chapter 3, Is It Time for an Infrastructure Push? The Macroeconomic Effects of Public Investment ↗
  6. [6] Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides, Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth, IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/14/02 (February 2014) ↗
  7. [7] OECD, Focus on Inequality and Growth (December 2014), and Cingano, Trends in Income Inequality and its Impact on Economic Growth, OECD SEM Working Paper 163 (2014) ↗
  8. [8] Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies, NBER Working Paper 26144 (revised August 2019), published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(3), 2020 ↗
  9. [9] Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi), 14 September 2009 ↗
  10. [10] Jakobsen, Jakobsen, Kleven and Zucman, Wealth Taxation and Wealth Accumulation, Theory and Evidence from Denmark, NBER Working Paper 24371 (2018), published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(1), 2020 ↗
  11. [11] OECD, The Role and Design of Net Wealth Taxes in the OECD, OECD Tax Policy Studies (2018), executive summary and chapter 3 ↗
  12. [12] PIT-CNT consultative commission, Propuesta de creación de una sobretasa del IPPF (24 November 2025) ↗
  13. [13] TV 2, Socialdemokratiet vil beskatte de 22.000 rigeste danskere (26 February 2026) ↗
  14. [14] Barry, J., A Genealogy of Economic Growth as Ideology and Cold War Core State Imperative, New Political Economy (2018), quoting Kuznets, S., How to Judge Quality, The New Republic 147:16 (20 October 1962), p. 29 ↗