Wealth Tax Supporters
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“A wealth tax will kill family firms and farms.”

A wealth tax with a high threshold reaches a few thousand owners, and the Norwegian firms studied did not close

Under Warren's design in the US less than 0.1% of families would pay. Colombia had 34,229 filers in 2025 and Bolivia 263 registered payers. In Norway an economist who studied the 2021 to 2024 increases finds no sign that firms owned by wealth tax payers paid out more, invested less or went bankrupt more often.

Picture a bakery, a farm or a workshop that has been in one family for three generations. Whether a wealth tax touches it depends on one number: the threshold.

#Who actually pays

Under the Warren wealth tax in the United States, which starts at US$50 million, less than 0.1% of families would owe anything.[1] In France in 2016 the old wealth tax reached 351,152 tax households, slightly less than 1% of the total.[2] Colombia's tax starts at about US$1 million and was paid by 34,229 filers in 2025.[3] Bolivia's started at Bs 30 million and had 263 registered payers at the end of October 2025.[4]

Thresholds can also be set low, and that is a decision. Spain's taxpayers fell from 981,498 in 2007 to 188,680 in 2015 as thresholds rose, and in the Swiss canton of Bern, with low thresholds, 30% of all taxpayers owed wealth tax in 2001 to 2011.[2] A middle-class threshold reaches the bakery and the farm. A threshold at the top does not, and the proposals we back are at the top.

#What happened to Norwegian firms

Norway raised its wealth tax in 2022 and 2023 and changed how shares are valued. An economist who studied the firms writes that there was no evidence that Norwegian-owned firms paid out more dividends or invested less, and no evidence that the reform led to more bankruptcies.[5] The study covers four years, and it is the best we have.

#The owner leaving is a separate question

When a wealthy owner emigrates from Sweden or Denmark, the firm's employment falls 33%, investment 22% and value added 34%, mostly through closure.[6] A Princeton study of Norway finds the firms of owners who leave have revenues 12.6% lower than firms whose owners stay.[10] Those are findings about owners leaving. They don't show that the tax closes firms. Whether owners leave, and how to keep them from leaving, is its own question, and the page on departures answers it: an exit tax that follows the owner and charges the value of the company.

Exemptions are the real danger to firms, because they invite rearranging. In Spain, a higher wealth tax pushed owners to hold more of their wealth in business assets that the law exempts.[7] That protects some firms and costs the state revenue. Sweden and Denmark show where exemptions lead: the base wears away until the tax is repealed. Don't write the exemption in.

#Not every company has to survive

A 1% tax on the stock is the same as a 20% tax on a 5% return.[8] A firm worth US$100 million to its owner, earning a normal 5% a year, pays US$1 million of wealth tax out of US$5 million of earnings: one fifth. A firm that can't support that, through a dividend, selling a small stake or a loan, isn't earning the return its owner thinks it is.

In a market economy, ownership changes hands. A share in a company has a price, and when the share is sold the company carries on under a new owner. An owner who has to sell part of a firm to pay 1% or 2% of its value has sold a small part of it. The employees and the customers stay.

#A design for owners

Put the threshold at the top, as Colombia, Bolivia and the Warren design do. Allow deferral, as Norway does from income year 2026: up to three years, at the policy rate plus 5 percentage points.[9] Leave out exemptions for business assets, because they are what erodes the base. Value private companies from their own accounts. The page on liquidity sets out the options.

#Who says so

The Norwegian story covers the Norwegian study, the Colombian story and the Bolivian story cover the thresholds, and the United States story covers the federal design.

#Where to look next

The next page takes up the claim that a wealth tax will spread beyond the very rich. The liquidity page covers how owners pay.

#Sources

  1. [1] Saez and Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity conference draft (5 to 6 September 2019), footnote 3 ↗
  2. [2] OECD, The Role and Design of Net Wealth Taxes in the OECD, OECD Tax Policy Studies (2018), chapters 1 and 3 ↗
  3. [3] La República, Al cierre de 2025, 34.229 contribuyentes pagaron el impuesto al patrimonio (18 August 2026), DIAN figures ↗
  4. [4] Servicio de Impuestos Nacionales (Bolivia), Memoria Enero-Octubre 2025, section 1.4 ↗
  5. [5] Marius Ring, Taxing Entrepreneurial Wealth, Evidence from Norway, 2021 to 2025, NBER Working Paper 35854 (October 2026, not peer reviewed) ↗
  6. [6] Jakobsen, Kleven, Kolsrud, Landais and Muñoz, Taxing Top Wealth: Migration Responses and Their Aggregate Economic Implications, American Economic Review 116(10), 3674-3720 (2026), accepted version ↗
  7. [7] Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré and Mas-Montserrat, Behavioural responses to the (re)introduction of wealth taxes, Evidence from Spain, IEB Working Paper 2019/04 ↗
  8. [8] Mirrlees et al., Tax by Design, Institute for Fiscal Studies (2011), chapter 15 ↗
  9. [9] Skatteetaten, Utsett betaling av formuesskatt beregnet på virksomhetsformue ↗
  10. [10] Christine Blandhol, Curbing Tax Flight? Aggregate Effects of Taxing Entrepreneur Migration, Princeton University job market paper (7 December 2025) ↗